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Abstract 
Governments have been advocating for an open 
approach to encourage private sector disclosing 
relevant information in order to create more efficient 
market. However, it is not always clear what 
information are needed by consumers. Policy makers 
need to develop measures that help decide what 
information should be disclosed and whether a 
disclosure should be mandated. In this research, we 
focus on information disclosure in organic products, 
where consumers find the complex organic labeling 
hard to understand. Through two studies, we show that 
feed origin makes a significant difference in 
consumers’ choice; and sellers with feed from non-
USA countries would be motivated to disguise the 
information on feed origin. We propose a way to 
implement “smart” information disclosure that can 
effectively distinguish USA feed from feed with 
undisclosed origin, which enables the feed from USA to 
claim a higher price premium. Our findings have 
policy implications for organic product disclosure.      
 
1. Introduction  
An efficient market calls for a free flow of 
information between sellers and buyers. If properly 
designed, information disclosure should promote 
autonomy and quality of individual decision making, 
increase efficiency and help prevent market failure 
resulting from incomplete and asymmetric information 
coupled with misaligned incentives [1-3]. However, 
inappropriate information disclosure fails to improve 
the quality of consumer decisions [1, 4, 5]. When 
directly asked, consumers say they want to know 
virtually everything about their choices [4]. In reality, 
one of the most ubiquitous problems is the information 
overload effect. Consumers are constantly confronted 
with complex instructions and fine prints, yet they have 
limited capacity to attend the information presented. 
Too much disclosure can be counterproductive when it 
distracts from more important information [1]. On the 
other hand, not disclosing the relevant information 
would introduce bias to people’s decision making. 
Moreover, people tend to pay even less attention to the 
absence of information than to its presence, even when 
both are equally informative [6].  
Policymakers need to choose the most important 
and relevant information, and provide guidance for 
information to be disclosed in simple and easy to digest 
form. It is not an easy task to decide what information 
should be disclosed and how the information should be 
presented to consumers. We focus on organic food 
industry because of the information asymmetry 
between sellers and buyers for this product category 
[7]. It is very hard, if not impossible, for consumers to 
detect the organic characteristics and quality even after 
purchase and use of the product [8]. Consumers 
typically rely on information cues such as organic 
certification and labels to make a judgement on the 
quality, while the organic certification process is 
criticized for lacking rigor and adequate transparency 
[9].  
The market of organic food has expanded 
drastically and the US domestic organic production is 
not keeping up with the demand. According to the 
Organic Trade Association, sales of organic food and 
non-food products reach another record in 2014, 
totaling $39.1 billion [10]. Domestic organic food 
production has expanded 240 percent between 2002 
and 2011, compared with 3 percent for non-organic 
food production [11]. The growing demand for 
organics, coupled with the near-total reliance by U.S. 
farmers on genetically modified corn and soybeans, is 
driving a surge in imports from other nations where 
crops largely are free of bioengineering1. Take organic 
eggs as an example, America's farmers are not growing 
enough organic corn and soybeans to feed the country's 
organic animals. In 2014, the U.S. gets more than half 
of its organic soybeans from abroad. The biggest 
suppliers are China and India2.  
                                                 
1 “U.S. Forced to Import Corn as Shoppers Demand Organic Food,”  
 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-15/romanian-
corn-imports-to-u-s-surge-as-shoppers-demand-organic> 
2 “Chickens That Lay Organic Eggs Eat Imported Food, And It's 
Pricey,” 
<http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/02/26/283112526/chicken
s-laying-organic-eggs-eat-imported-food-and-its-pricey> 
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In organic food category, country of feed origin is a 
manifestation of the information asymmetry between 
sellers and buyers. Although USDA’s Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS) requires country of origin 
being disclosed on the labeling of most food products, 
no regulation is found to mandate the disclosure of the 
feed origin3. In another word, if an egg is laid in the 
US, the country of origin of the egg is USA. However, 
if the hen that laid the egg ate imported organic feed, 
while the sellers are aware of the feed origin of their 
product and the potential problems with certification 
process of organic food in certain countries, they may 
not be motivated to disclosure feed origin. Whether 
country of feed origin is an important purchase 
criterion for consumers should be of interest to policy 
makers, because this may serve as the basis for 
deciding whether feed origin should be a mandatory 
disclosure. This question could also be of interest to 
suppliers in that they are more informed of whether 
labeling feed origin on their products could enable 
them to charge price premium. This would especially 
be of interest to third party platforms, because it helps 
them design the system that match the needs of 
consumers.     
In this research, we investigate the following three 
research questions. 1) Is the disclosure of country of 
feed origin necessary for consumers in the market for 
organic food? 2) Can a price premium be claimed on 
organic food from countries with a more stringent legal 
framework? 3) What are the effects on consumer 
choices and price premium if the disclosure of feed 
origin is mandated, or made a salient attributes through 
“smart” disclosure?  
We conducted two studies using online subjects. 
Organic egg is chosen as the focal category. Through a 
conjoint study and using a Hierarchical Bayes choice 
model, we find that information on feed origin is an 
important factor in people’s purchase decision of eggs, 
more so than USDA organic certification label. This 
study proposes an approach that can help policy 
makers and private sectors decide what information 
firms should disclose, and assess the impact on 
marketing implication of the policy. The findings have 
implications for smart disclosure policy which aims to 
present information in an accessible way, in order to 
empower consumer decision. This article contributes to 
the burgeoning literature on the information regulation 
and marketing of sustainable products. To authors’ 
knowledge, we are the first to explore the importance 
and disclosure of country of feed origin for organic 
food products, which has important implications for 
                                                 
3http://www.fsis.usda.gov/shared/PDF/Labeling_Requiremen
ts_Guide.pdf 
policy makers, marketers and information sharing 
platforms.  
 
2. Literature review  
In this section, we review the literature on the public 
policy and consumer motivation of organic products. 
On the regulatory aspect, we focus on the policy 
environment for organic food, highlighting the 
standards that govern organic production and quality 
control. On the demand side, we discuss consumer 
motivation to purchase organic food, the information 
gap between sellers and buyers of organic products, 
and the reliance of information cues for consumers to 
judge the quality of organic products.  
 
2.1 Organic Food Policy 
Before the establishment of a federal policy framework 
for organic food, a patchwork of industry standards and 
state organic food laws had emerged since 1973 to 
govern the U.S. organic food industry [12]. 
Responding to the call from organic farmers, 
certification agents and organic trade association, a 
national Organic Food Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) 
was enacted by Congress to harmonize the divergent 
standards. OFPA delegate the task of regulating 
organic production, handling and labeling to the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), which 
promulgated National Organic Program in 2002 as 
binding rules to enforce OFPA. The purpose of these 
federal regulations is to establish and implement 
standards to govern the organic food industry and 
ensure consumers that agriculture product marketed 
with the organic label met uniform and consistent 
standards [9].  
NOP made specific requirements for organic 
crop production, livestock farming, and the handling of 
organic products4. To qualify as organic egg, the 
poultry need to be fed organic feed. Organic feed are 
produced on farms that practice organic farming, 
which requires that crops must be produced on land 
that are free of synthetic pesticide, herbicides and 
fertilizer for three years before harvest and sufficient 
buffer zone exists to reduce contamination from 
surrounding lands [13]. The USDA certifies organic 
products according to these guidelines. The way by 
which the standards are ensured is through a 
certification process. USDA however does not conduct 
field inspections. Instead, it accredits certification 
agents to review and certify organic farms and 
processor in accordance to the standard set up in the 
OFPA [9]. Currently, around 80 agents received 
USDA’s authorization to certify farms and businesses. 
                                                 
4 7 CFR Part 205, Subpart C - Organic Production and 
Handling Requirements 
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Among them, many USDA-accredited certifying 
agents are outside of US and most are allowed to 
certify farms and businesses around the world [14]. 
This certification system is not free from 
problems. One of the major issue is that certifying 
agents are private entities that on the one hand have a 
vested interests to maintain their creditability by 
enforcing OFPA standards, and on the other hand are 
paid by the applicants and need to compete for the 
market to ensure the viability. An operation that may 
has non-compliance issues may shop around for a more 
lenient agent instead of addressing the risks and 
problems, which essentially lower the rigor of the 
organic standards. More importantly, the NOP 
regulations ignored the original intent of the OPFA that 
requires periodic residue testing by certifying agents. 
Instead, the NOP regulations do not mandate residue 
testing and deferred the decision to state officials and 
certifying agents on whether to perform such testing. 
Further, the state officials and certifying agents must 
bear the costs of the tests. For a market where an 
applicant can freely choose certifying agents and the 
agents have little incentives to perform the necessary 
testing for fear of losing business, the NOP regulation 
have effectively eliminated the residue testing 
requirements [9]. Another critique of the current 
certification system is that the NOP have not been 
effective in regulating foreign certifying agents.  
 
2.2. Information Asymmetry and Smart 
Disclosure Policy 
Consumers are generally not satisfied with the 
availability of information that can guide their 
purchase decision [15], and arguably, they are 
especially in a disadvantaged position to judge the 
potential compromises that the organic certification 
system creates. Information asymmetry, the gap of 
information with regard to the quality of organic 
products between consumers and producers, are 
expressly severe because of the nature of the products. 
In making choices for products, consumer typically 
relies on the dominant quality attributes, namely 
search, experience, credence and potemkin attributes 
[16]. A search attribute, such as freshness or 
appearance, is known before the purchase and 
consumers have the ability to examine it. Experience 
attributes, such as taste, are known after the 
consumption of the product. Credence attributes, such 
as nutrition or contamination, are difficult to be 
observed by consumers, but they can rely on third 
parties for quality assurance. However, as noted 
earlier, organic food can reach the market without any 
residue testing, which is a failure to ensure the 
credence attributes. Potemkin attributes are process-
related qualities that cannot be proved and controlled 
through laboratory analyses by either the consumers or 
external institutions. Only close monitoring of the 
internal production process would have a chance to 
detect fraud and mislabeling [16]. Organic claim with 
the primary goal to “optimize the health and 
productivity of interdependent communities of soil life, 
plants, animals and people” [17] are essentially 
potemkin attributes that are especially susceptible to 
the lack of quality information on the side of 
consumers. The NOP is process oriented regulation, 
and the organic certification system is designed to 
closely monitor the production process. However, 
weaknesses of the NOP regulation give rise to 
conditions for fraud and opportunistic behaviors in 
such markets. This is especially troublesome for 
organics imported from some developing countries 
bearing “USDA Organic” seals, where the legal 
framework is weak and corruptions are rampant [9].  
Smart disclosure is a policy initiative 
promoted by the US government to use information 
disclosure as a regulatory approach to create more 
transparent, efficient market for goods and services 
(Executive Office of the President National Science 
and Technology Council, 2013). The basic premise of 
smart disclosure is giving more power to the general 
public by transferring control of personal data from the 
hands of corporate interests to the public [18, 19]. 
Recently, smart disclosure policy has been applied in 
various sectors such as education, energy and 
environment, health care, finance, food and nutrition, 
safety, telecommunication, transportation and others. 
Proponents of smart disclosure argue that such policy 
can also be used to help consumers in making informed 
decisions by minimizing behavioral biases resulting 
from information overload and aversion to complexity 
that consequently cause consumers to make 
undesirable choices [20]. There is, however, a need for 
public and private sector to connect information 
disclosed with consumers’ motivations in order to be 
effective in empowering consumer decision making.    
 
2.3. Consumer Motivation and Demands for 
Information  
Consumers buy organic versus conventional products 
for several reasons. Prior research have shown that 
they are motivated by the perceived health and 
nutrition benefits of organic products, environmental 
concerns, and ethical considerations of animal welfare 
[21]. Organic food is generally regarded as more 
nutritious and safer than convention products [22]. 
Recent expansion of organic food market has also been 
seen as the results of heightened awareness of the 
impact of food systems on environment [23]. Such 
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for the 
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additional benefits consuming the organic products 
[24]. 
However, these values are not attributes that 
can be directly observed by consumers. Instead, they 
rely on various information cues on the label when 
evaluating products under uncertainty. Labels or 
organic claims are widely used to transmit important 
quality information to consumers [25]. Organic 
labeling has been observed to be associated with a 
higher level of perceived healthfulness, hedonism, 
environmental friendliness and food safety [26, 27]. 
Since organic eggs are credence and potemkin 
products, labels bearing organic certification elicit 
certain level of confidence of the values acquired 
through consuming organic egg.  
Not all organic labels, however, elicit the 
same level of trust. In general, a third-party 
certification schedule is considered to be more 
trustworthy than producers’ or retailers’ private 
labelling scheme [28, 29]. Label agency makes a 
difference to consumers’ perception and willingness to 
pay. For example, in Switzerland, organic consumers 
were willing to pay a higher premiums for products 
with the Bio Suisses label, a label backed by the 
farmers’ umbrella organization, compared to products 
with other organic label [30]. Consumers in Denmark 
and Czech Reblic are willing to pay the highest price 
premium for governmental logo [31]. The reputation 
and brand image of the label agency lend creditability 
to the label, and enhance the level of consumer trust. 
Although consumers are not willing to automatically 
assume fidelity of quality assurance behind of every 
label, they may place greater level of trust over the 
logos backed by ethical practices and stringent legal 
requirements [20].  In the US, USDA organic has been 
an established logo with high level of consumer 
awareness and positive perception of the certification 
scheme behind it, consumers are responding to USDA 
organic milk more positively then generic organic 
labels [32]. In addition, animal welfare are cited as a 
major concern for consumers purchasing organic, and 
flock size is often listed by organic egg producers and 
organic product information sharing organizations 
(e.g., The Cornucopia Institute) as an indicator for 
animal welfare. 
The extant literature has not systematically 
examined the information cues other than organic 
labels that consumers would rely on to assess the 
quality of organic products. The marketing literature 
has documented country of origin as one of the 
extrinsic information cues to help consumers detect the 
quality of products. However, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence in the literature on whether 
consumer reacts to the information on organic 
products’ feed origin. Given the weakness of organic 
certification process and accountability in certain 
countries, and yet no regulation to mandate the 
disclosure of the feed origin, policy makers may want 
to know if it is a potentially important decision making 
factor in purchasing organic food for consumers and if 
its disclosure should be made mandatory. Similarly, 
certain organic sellers may benefit from disclosing the 
feed origin, if it is indeed valued by consumers and the 
sellers can charge a price premium labeling feed from 
the US.  
 
3. Empirical Study 
 
3.1. Study 1 
Study Design. The purpose of Study 1 is to address the 
first two research questions. A conjoint approach was 
used to elicit consumer preferences. Conjoint analysis 
has been applied in marketing field as a major set of 
techniques for measuring buyers’ tradeoffs among 
multiattributed products and services [33]. It presents 
consumers with various combinations of product 
attributes and statistically estimates the effects of those 
attributes on choice. Conjoint analysis has been widely 
used in new product design and marketing mix 
decisions.  
We collected data using a Qualtrics web-
based survey and a nationwide sample recruited from 
an online panel. A total of 130 respondents participated 
in this study. The respondents were screened to be US 
citizens or permanent residents and they must be over 
18 years old. Most of the participants have purchased 
organic food (95.3%) and majority have bought 
organic eggs (66.7%). On the introduction screen, we 
informed participants that the purpose of our study was 
to understand how consumers purchase eggs. They 
then went through 16 choice-based conjoint tasks. The 
attributes and levels used in the conjoint exercises are 
shown in Table 1. Scholars have looked into consumer 
preference on organic eggs in terms of price, organic 
label, USDA label and cage-free [32]. In our conjoint 
design, we included feed origin, our focal point of 
interest, together with attributes from the literature. 
The attribute levels were designed to be consistent with 
the market situation. In market place, organic and non-
organic eggs have different price points. In our study, 
organic eggs are priced at $4.99, $3.99 or $2.99 and 
non-organic eggs are priced at $3.99, $2.99 or $1.99. 
USDA is only associated with organic eggs and they 
are typically sold at a premium in the market place. In 
the study, USDA organic eggs are priced at $4.99 or 
$3.99. Feed origin has a level “Not disclosed”. In study 
1, we left this attribute level empty in the choice 
exercises. This design is consistent with the market 
place situation, where the feed origin is typically not 
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disclosed on the package. Table 2 shows an example of 
a conjoint choice set. Respondents were told to choose 
the eggs they prefer the most assuming all the options 
are dozen eggs and are identical on other attributes. 
They were also given the option of not choosing. 
 
Table 1: Conjoint Design, Attributes and Levels 
Attributes Levels 
Price per 
dozen 
$1.99 $2.99 $3.99 $4.99 
Organic 
feed 
Organic 
feed 
Non-
organic 
feed 
  
Cage-free Cage-
free 
In cages   
USDA USDA Non-
USDA 
  
Flock size <10000 10,000-
100,000 
100,000-
250,000 
Not 
disclosed 
Feed origin USA China Argentina Not 
disclosed 
 
Table 2: An Example of the Conjoint Exercise 
  
Egg A Egg B Egg C 
Price: 
$3.99/dozen 
Price: 
$4.99/dozen 
Price: 
$2.99/dozen 
Organic feed Organic feed Non organic feed 
Hens are raised in 
cages 
Hens are raised 
cage free 
Hens are raised 
cage free 
No USDA 
Organic 
certification 
USDA Organic 
certification 
No USDA 
Organic 
certification 
Size: 10,000-
100,000 birds 
Size: 100,000-
250,000 birds 
 
 Feed comes 
from Argentina 
Feed comes from 
USA 
 
Model and Results.  
We use hierarchical Bayes logit model to analyze the 
conjoint data. Consumer i’s utility from choosing 
option j can be written as: 
(1) ij,,,
,,,
,,,0,
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where 
OriginND       = dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if feed origin is not disclosed and 0 if otherwise; 
OriginC          = dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if feed origin is China and 0 if otherwise; 
OriginA          = dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if feed origin is Argentina and 0 if otherwise; 
Price               = price per dozen; 
Organic         = dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if feed is organic feed and 0 if otherwise; 
CageFree       = dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if eggs are cage-free 0 if otherwise; 
USDA             = dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if eggs are USDA organic and 0 if otherwise; 
SizeND           = dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if hens are raised in houses with bird size not 
disclosed and 0 if otherwise; 
SizeSm           = dummy variable, taking the value of 
1 if hens are raised in houses with less than 10,000 
birds and 0 if otherwise; 
 
The error term is assumed to follow the extreme value 
(0,1) distribution, and as a result the probability that 
consumer i chooses alternative j in choice set s follows 
the multinomial logit model: 
(2) 

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The model development so far has focused on a given 
individual. The preference is expected to vary across 
individuals. The heterogeneous preference across 
individuals is captured in Equation (3), where the 
individual preference parameters βi’s are assumed to 
follow a multivariate normal distribution with mean   
and variance-covariance matrix Δ. 
 
(3) 
),(~  Normali       
                                        
Model-based inference. The average preference 
estimates (  ) are reported in Table 4. For the purpose 
of parameter identification, we set preference for egg 
feed origin in USA to zero. Relative preferences for 
feed origin from China and Argentina are significantly 
negative from zero at the 1% level. In another word, on 
average, consumers prefer the eggs with feed from 
USA more than from either China or Argentina. When 
feed origin information is missing, its preference is not 
significantly different that with feed origin in USA. A 
closer look at the distribution of the heterogeneity for 
this attribute (see Figure 1) reveals that the distribution 
of βi,OriginND resembles the shape of the mixture of two 
Normal distributions. About one fourth (26.9%) of 
consumers belong to a segment that are skeptical and 
have a negative view about the feed origin when it is 
missing, manifested by the left portion of the curve 
peaking on the negative side. The right part of the 
distribution with a small peak on the positive side 
indicates that a small proportion (17.7%) of consumers 
have a positive view of the missing origin. The 
preference of the majority of consumers (55.4%) for 
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the eggs with missing information on feed origin is not 
significant from zero. It is likely that these consumers 
assume the missing feed origin information indicates 
the feed comes from the USA. Another interesting 
finding is that the preference magnitude for organic 
feed (0.84) is not as big as consumers’ negative 
association towards eggs if the chicken’s feed came 
from China (-1.76). In another word, eggs with organic 
feed from China are less favorable compared to eggs 
with non-organic feed from the USA.  
 
Figure 1: Study 1 – Distribution of Heterogeneity 
 
 
Table 4: Model Estimation Results 
 Study 1 Study 2 
OriginND -0.44 (0.20) -0.74* (0.26) 
OriginC -1.76* (0.30) -1.46* (0.28) 
OriginA -0.95* (0.19) -0.60* (0.19) 
Price -0.68* (0.06) -0.64* (0.07) 
Organic feed 0.84* (0.20) 0.63* (0.19)  
Cage-free 1.53* (0.15) 1.57* (0.14) 
USDA 0.00 (0.27) -0.33 (0.28) 
SizeND 0.71* (0.12) 0.51* (0.14) 
SizeSm 0.48* (0.12) 0.33* (0.13) 
Note: The table shows posterior means along with 
posterior standard deviations in parentheses. 
* Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Contrary to the findings from extant literature 
that well-known certification logos of organic labeling 
are favored by consumers (Janssen and Hamm 2012; 
Kiesel and Villas-Boas 2007), the preference for 
USDA certification is found to be zero for these 
consumers when they choose organic eggs. The 
general pattern of preference estimates for other 
variables is as expected. Price negatively impacts the 
utility. For bird size, the missing information on bird 
size has a positive preference relative to bird size 
bigger than 10,000 birds, so does the small bird size 
(less than 10,000).     
Market Simulation. To further assess the 
impact of feed origin information disclosure, we 
compared the market share of organic eggs when the 
feed origin information is missing vs. disclosed. 
Specifically, we want to understand if the sellers were 
to voluntarily disclose the feed origin of their organic 
eggs, what market share and price premium could be 
claimed after the voluntary disclosure compared to the 
original market situation when feed origin is missing. 
We computed brand shares under a fairly 
representative market scenario as shown in Table 5. 
Egg A is non-organic, non-cage free and lowest priced 
at $1.99/dozen. Egg B is non-organic, but cage-free. It 
is priced at $2.99/dozen. Egg C is USDA organic, 
cage-free and most expensively priced at $4.99/dozen. 
In Scenario 1 (baseline scenario), the information on 
feed origin is missing for Egg A, B and C. The market 
shares for A, B and C are 21.14%, 49.46% and 29.40% 
respectively. In Scenario 2, when the feed origin of egg 
C is changed to USA, the market shares for A, B and C 
are 18.18%, 42.54% and 39.27%. The share of organic 
egg is increased by about 10% when the feed origin is 
labeled as coming from the USA from when the feed 
origin in unknown. The increase in egg C’s market 
share mainly comes from the middle tiered egg (egg 
B), which witnessed a loss of about 7% in share. The 
price premium that egg C could charge is $0.65/dozen 
if the feed from USA is labeled compared to the 
baseline situation when the feed origin information is 
missing. The price premium is calculated assuming 
that the market share in Scenario 2 is not changed from 
the baseline scenario. In another word, if the same 
market share were to be maintained at the same level 
as the baseline scenario, Egg C could claim a higher 
price of $0.65/dozen when the feed origin information 
for organic eggs is changed from missing to from the 
USA. Finally, in Scenario 3, when the feed origin of 
egg C is changed to China, the market shares for A, B 
and C are 26.95%, 63.04% and 10.01%. While egg B 
(share increased by 13.58% compared to baseline) is 
the bigger beneficiary of the egg C’s market share 
decline (decreased by 19.39% compared to baseline), 
some egg C buyers even switched to egg A (share 
increased by 5.81%). Egg C with feed imported from 
China would have to discount by $1.94/dozen if the 
feed origin information is labeled in order to maintain 
the same market share. In addition, policy makers 
would be interested to know the market impact of a 
mandatory disclosure of feed origin. If under a 
situation where all the feed origin is a mandated 
disclosure, the price premium of USA feed over 
Chinese feed is $2.59/dozen (difference between 
Scenario 2 and Scenario 3). 
 
Table 5: Study 1 Market Simulation 
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Egg A Egg B Egg C
Price: $1.99/dozen Price: $2.99/dozen Price: $4.99/dozen
Non organic feed Non organic feed Organic feed
Non cage-free Cage-free Cage-free
Non USDA Non USDA USDA
Size: not disclosed Size: not disclosed Size: not disclosed
Feed origin: Missing Feed origin: Missing Feed origin: Missing
Market share: 21.14% Market share: 49.46% Market share: 29.40%
Feed origin: Missing Feed origin: Missing Feed origin: USA
Market share: 18.18% Market share: 42.54% Market share: 39.27%
Feed origin: Missing Feed origin: Missing Feed origin: China
Market share: 26.95% Market share: 63.04% Market share: 10.01%
Scenario 1 (baseline)
Scenario 2 (USA)
Scenario 3 (China)
 
 
In summary, Study 1 finds evidence that the 
information on feed origin is an important factor in 
people’s purchase decision of eggs, more so than 
organic feed and USDA certification label. Without a 
mandatory disclosure policy, a small price premium 
($0.65/dozen) can be potentially claimed by labeling 
the feed from USA. However, the preference of 
missing information on feed origin is not significantly 
different from the preference of feed from USA. 
Sellers of the eggs with feed from non-USA countries 
should be motivated to disguise the information on 
feed origin. If the policy makers mandate the 
disclosure of feed origin, the USA feed could claim a 
much bigger price premium ($2.59/dozen) over the 
least popular feed origin in the study.  
 
3.2. Study 2 
Study Design. Study 1 represents the current market 
situation in which feed origin is not required to 
disclose, but companies may choose to disclose it. The 
findings from Study 1 show that eggs with feed from 
USA have a competitive edge compared to eggs with 
feed from China and Argentina. At the same time, not 
labeling the feed origin from non-USA countries would 
not hurt the sales of the corresponding eggs. In the 
current market situation where the labeling of feed 
origin is not mandated, the producers and retailers of 
eggs with USA feed won’t benefit much from labeling 
the feed origin. Consumers’ welfare will be 
undermined if they do want eggs with feed from the 
USA but end up buying eggs with missing feed origin 
information. However, as we discussed earlier, a 
mandatory disclosure could take a long time to become 
a policy. Increasingly, consumers are becoming more 
reliant on third party product information platforms to 
find out more information about products. In Study 2, 
we explore a way for the third party product 
information platforms to more effectively signal the 
unavailability of the missing information on feed 
origin.  
To make the results comparable with those of 
Study 1, we again used egg as focal product category 
in Study 2. The data was again collected using a 
Qualtrics web-based survey and a nationwide online 
sample. 130 respondents (a different sample from 
Study 1) participated in Study 2. The attributes and 
levels used in the conjoint exercises are the same with 
those in Study 1. The only difference is that the 
undisclosed feed origin is labeled literally as “Feed 
origin is not disclosed” instead of missing, shown in 
Table 6. It has been found that consumers tend to rely 
on information that is more salient, and information 
presentation can be used to highlight meaning that is 
less salient on its own [34]. Displaying “Feed origin is 
not disclosed” could raise the salience of this attribute 
level and potentially help consumers distinguish the 
feed that comes from USA vs. undisclosed feed origin. 
Study 2 participants have similar demographic 
background to Study 1 respondents too.  
 
Table 6: An Example of the Conjoint Exercise in 
Study 2 
Egg A Egg B Egg C 
Price: 
$3.99/dozen 
Price: 
$4.99/dozen 
Price: 
$2.99/dozen 
Organic feed Organic feed Non organic feed 
Hens are raised in 
cages 
Hens are raised 
cage free 
Hens are raised 
cage free 
No USDA 
Organic 
certification 
USDA Organic 
certification 
No USDA 
Organic 
certification 
Size: 10,000-
100,000 birds 
Size: 100,000-
250,000 birds 
Flock size is not 
disclosed 
Feed origin is 
not disclosed 
Feed comes from 
Argentina 
Feed comes from 
USA 
 
Model-based inference. The average preference 
estimates (  ) in Study 2 are reported next to Study 1 
results in Table 4. The overall pattern of the preference 
is similar to Study 1 except for the undisclosed feed 
origin. The preference for undisclosed feed origin is 
significantly negative from zero in Study 2, whereas it 
is not significant when the information of feed origin is 
missing in Study 1. Analysis on heterogeneity reveals 
that 37.7% of respondents have a negative opinion of 
the undisclosed feed origin, an increase of more than 
ten percent from 26.9% in Study 1. The new 
information disclosure method that specifies the 
unavailable information on feed origin as “not 
disclosed” rather than missing makes the feed origin 
from USA much more appealing in comparison. It is 
noteworthy that average consumers’ negative 
association towards eggs if the chicken’s feed comes 
from a “not disclosed” location (-0.74) overwhelms the 
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preference magnitude for organic eggs (0.63). It 
implies that all others equal, an average consumer 
would prefer eggs with non-organic feed coming from 
USA to eggs with organic feed coming from a “not 
disclosed” location.      
Market Simulation. Similar to Study 1, we 
compare the market share of eggs when the feed origin 
information is “not disclosed” vs. disclosed in order to 
assess the impact of this new feed origin information 
disclosure method. The market simulation is computed 
under a fairly representative market scenario as shown 
in Table 7. Egg A is non-organic, non-cage free and 
lowest priced at $1.99/dozen. Egg B is non-organic, 
but cage-free. It is priced at $2.99/dozen. Egg C is 
USDA organic, cage-free and most expensively priced 
at $4.99/dozen. In Scenario 1 (baseline scenario), the 
information on feed origin is “not disclosed” for Egg 
A, B and C. The market shares for A, B and C are 
22.29%, 56.50% and 21.21% respectively. In Scenario 
2, when the feed origin of the organic egg C is changed 
to USA, the market shares for A, B and C are 18.09%, 
45.85% and 36.06%. The share of the organic eggs is 
increased by about 15% from scenario 1 to 2. The 
increase in egg C’s market share mainly comes from 
egg B, which witnesses a loss of about 11% in share. 
The price premium that egg C could charge is 
$1.16/dozen if the feed from USA is labeled compared 
to “not disclosed” feed origin. Similar to Study 1, the 
price premium is calculated assuming that the market 
share in Scenario 2 is not changed from the baseline 
scenario. The higher price premium that egg C with 
USA feed could claim in comparison to that in Study 1 
($1.16 vs. $0.65 per dozen) signifies the power of the 
new information disclosure method. Finally, in 
Scenario 3, when the feed origin of egg C is changed to 
China, the market shares for A, B and C are 25.02%, 
63.40% and 11.58%. Egg C with feed imported from 
China would have to discount by $1.13/dozen if the 
feed origin information is labeled. 
Study 2 tests an information sharing method 
for the third party product information platform to 
effectively signal the unavailability of the missing 
information on feed origin, when mandatory disclosure 
is not in place. The goal is to find an inexpensive way 
to reduce the harm caused by information asymmetry, 
so that consumers could pay more attention to the 
missing information on feed origin when they shop for 
organic eggs. With the feed origin shown as “not 
disclosed” instead of feed origin information being 
omitted for those non-disclosures on feed origin, the 
eggs with feed from USA are much more preferred by 
consumers and hence could charge a much higher price 
premium.   
Table 7: Study 2 Market Simulation 
Egg A Egg B Egg C
Price: $1.99/dozen Price: $2.99/dozen Price: $4.99/dozen
Non organic feed Non organic feed Organic feed
Non cage-free Cage-free Cage-free
Non USDA Non USDA USDA
Size: not disclosed Size: not disclosed Size: not disclosed
Feed origin: Not 
disclosed
Feed origin: Not 
disclosed
Feed origin: Not 
disclosed
Market share: 22.29% Market share: 56.50% Market share: 21.21%
Feed origin: Not 
disclosed
Feed origin: Not 
disclosed
Feed origin: USA
Market share: 18.09% Market share: 45.85% Market share: 36.06%
Feed origin: Not 
disclosed
Feed origin: Not 
disclosed
Feed origin: China
Market share: 25.02% Market share: 63.40% Market share: 11.58%
Scenario 1 (baseline)
Scenario 2 (USA)
Scenario 3 (China)
  
5. Discussion & Concluding Remarks 
In summary, our study found that revealing feed origin 
makes a difference in consumers’ choice of organic 
eggs. Eggs with feed from US have a competitive 
advantage over eggs with feed from China or 
Argentina. However, we were also able to illustrate 
that in a current market situation in which there is no 
requirement to disclose feed origin, seller are more 
often than not motivated to hide this information away 
from consumers. When feed origin is omitted from the 
label, eggs with non-US origin received similar 
preference to eggs with US feed origin. Assumingly, 
farmers in US are in general under more stringent legal 
requirement and thus are assumed by consumers of 
delivering higher quality of organic eggs. At the same 
time, meeting higher level quality requirements might 
also incur higher level of production cost. While not 
adequately compensated by the market, there might be 
little motivation for producers to pursue higher level of 
quality, leading to market failure. At the same time, 
consumers’ confidence and trust over organic 
certification regulation might be eroded over the time 
if they assumed of buying organic product with 
consistent and high quality while end up getting 
product with questionable quality.  
Our study demonstrated that this problem can be 
potentially corrected in two ways. The first approach is 
to mandate the disclosure of feed origin, and the 
second is to utilize a food traceability and disclosure 
platform that heighten the salience of feed origin. 
Government may require that firms producing goods 
with credence or potemkin attributes to substantiate 
their claims through mandatory labeling or disclosure 
system. This approach, although effective, requires 
major legislative actions, which may encounter 
substantial resistance in the short term. The difficulties 
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can be illustrated by the recent failure of passing a bill 
that would have set labeling standards for genetically 
modified foods based on arguments of protecting firms 
and consumers from raising costs and other interests. 
In US, food traceability systems that include feed 
origin have been largely motivated by economic 
incentives, rather than government regulation [35]. 
Although private sectors have developed enormous 
capability to track the flow of food, government has 
refrained from imposing traceability and disclosure 
standards to private entities, under the assumption that 
private will be motivated to disclose by benefits of 
expanded sales of high-value products. This study, 
however, proved that this assumption may not be 
correct. The policy implications of a mandated 
disclosure regulation may need to be revisited in light 
of the empirical results. The second approach, what we 
called “smart disclosure”, will reach similar desirable 
results by establishing guidelines for third-party 
platforms that raise the salience of missing information 
on feed origin. This might be a more realistic and low 
cost approach. Our study 2 illustrated that under this 
approach, even when the sellers are under no 
obligations to reveal feed origin, the stated omission of 
information became a salient variable, and will be 
treated with greater scrutiny from consumers. 
Consumers’ informed decisions in turn will unleash the 
power of the market, and provide incentives for sellers 
to reveal validating cues, such as US feed origin, to 
gain additional market share or claim higher premium. 
As such, our study thus provide important directions 
for smart disclosure policy initiatives.  
In addition, it also has policy implications for 
achieving sustainable consumption. In recent years, 
sustainability became a raising issue and the 
government roles in guiding consumption patterns 
toward a more sustainable way are particularly 
highlighted [25].  This paper introduced an approach 
by which public and private sector can determine what 
information is effective, and how information can be 
consequential in reaching the policy goals for a more 
sustainable pattern of consumption and production. By 
focusing on the feed origin of organic eggs, we 
discover that with an effective disclosure on feed 
origin, the US farmers might be at a better position to 
take advantage of the potential price premium over the 
imported feed and be more motivated to convert into 
organic farming, which delivers greater benefits to 
environment and local economy.  
This research made important contribution to 
theory for sustainability policy approaches. In reent 
years, an approach in the form of regulation through 
information [36], informational regulation and 
information governance [37] that emphasizes the role 
of creation, processing, dissemination, and utilization 
of information in environmental regulations has 
emerged. It has been observed that regulations that 
require private entities to disclose information lead to 
desirable outcomes, such as with the emission of toxic 
chemicals [38]. The use of information as a policy 
instrument is seen as promising because it enlists the 
market forces to create demand for firms to pursue 
environmental interests as a results of their connection 
to financial outcomes in the market. Information as a 
governance instrument to address social and 
environmental goals in future generations has received 
increasing attention from the e-government research 
(Estevez & Janowski, 2013). This study extends the 
understanding of information regulation in the context 
of consumer decision making in organic market. More 
importantly, it also revealed the limitation of such 
approach if it relies merely on voluntary disclosure. It 
appears that a combined approach that join regulatory 
mandates with information disclosure would be more 
effective. This might be a direction for more studies in 
the future. 
Finally, this research has limitations. First, we 
made feed origin as the focus of this paper as an 
illustration of our approach. More systematic 
evaluation of organic product attributes could be 
conducted by using similar approach to provide 
comprehensive guidelines for organic product 
information disclosure. Second, we find feed origin an 
important attribute in organic egg purchase and 
consumers prefer US feed. Future study should focus 
on the rationale and investigate the causes of the feed 
origin preference to provide more diagnostic 
suggestions for public and private sectors. 
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